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ABSTRACT
Most conventional accounts of India’s recent economic performance associate the pick-up in
economic growth with the liberalization of 1991. This paper demonstrates that the transition to high
growth occured around 1980, a full decade before economic liberalization. We investigate a number
of hypotheses about the causes of this growth—favorable external environment, fiscal stimulus,
trade liberalization, internal liberalization, the green revolution, public investment—and find them
wanting. We argue that growth was triggered by an attitudinal shift on the part of the national
government towards a pro-business (as opposed to pro-liberalization) approach. We provide some
evidence that is consistent with this argument.  We also find that registered manufacturing built up
in previous decades played an important role in influencing the pattern of growth across the Indian
states.  
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India’s economic performance during the first three decades since independence was 
christened the “Hindu” rate of growth, a term connoting a disappointing but not disastrous 
outcome, and playing to the cliché of the acquiescence in the present that the religion 
supposedly imbues, because of a greater emphasis on the hereafter. 
 
That cliché, of course, is gradually lapsing into disuse thanks to the remarkable 
transformation in India during the last two decades.  Since 1980, its economic growth rate 
has more than doubled, rising from 1.7 percent (in per-capita terms) in 1950-1980 to 3.8 
percent in 1980-2000.  Shackled by the socialist policies and the “license-permit-quota raj” 
(to use Rajaji’s memorable phrase) of the past, India used to serve as the exemplar of 
development strategies gone wrong.  It has now become the latest poster child for how 
economic growth can be unleashed with a turn towards free markets and open trade.  India 
has yet to catch up to China’s growth rates (or even to China’s level of income
1), but thanks 
to its solid democratic institutions and impressive performance in information technology, 
the country is increasingly vying with, if not displacing, China as the country of the future in 
the eyes of many knowledgeable observers.
2       
 
The improvement in India’s economic performance is obviously good news for its 1 billion 
people. But equally important, this transformation also holds hope for other poor countries 
around the world, insofar as it sends the message that rapid economic growth is attainable 
under appropriate policies.   
 
But what exactly are those “appropriate” policies that made the Indian miracle possible?  The 
conventional story about India, which can be glimpsed in any number of policy-oriented 
papers and newspaper articles, goes like this.  Until 1991, India’s policy makers followed 
misguided policies that closed the economy to international trade, erected inefficient 
industries under state guidance, riddled the private sector with extraordinarily cumbersome 
and detailed regulations, and suffocated private economic activity with controls and 
bureaucratic impediments. Then in 1991, the big breakthrough happened.  Spurred by a 
balance of payments crisis, Indian policy makers turned to technocrats such as Manmohan 
Singh, who promptly began the process of liberalizing the economy. Trade barriers were 
slashed, foreign investment was welcomed, the license raj was dismantled, and privatization 
began. The economy started to boom, with software exports and call centers leading the way.   
 
                                                 
1 According to PWT 6.1, India’s purchasing-power adjusted per-capita GDP stood at $2479 
in 2000, compared to $3747 for China.  However, there are reasons to believe India’s PPP 
level of income is understated (see Deaton et. al., 2004) 
2 See Huang and Khanna (2003).  2 
 
 
Like all caricatures, the above story has elements of truth in it.  It is indeed the case that until 
recently India had one of the most over-regulated and closed economies of the world.  It is 
also true that the economic liberalization of 1991 constitutes a watershed event for the Indian 
economy.  But the main difficulty with the standard account, as summarized above, is that 
the pick-up in India’s economic growth precedes the 1991 liberalization by a full decade.  
Even a cursory glance at the growth record reveals that the more-than-doubling of India’s 
growth rate takes place sometime around 1980, with very little discernible change in trend 
after 1991.  In fact, some indicators, such as economy-wide total factor productivity, even go 
in the “wrong” direction, showing a deceleration after 1991.  Therefore, the striking post-
1980 improvement in performance can not be attributed to the liberalization of 1991.  The 
latter may well have played a role in sustaining and deepening an ongoing process of growth, 
but we need to look elsewhere than the reforms of 1991 to understand how India made the 
transition to high growth.  A related implication is that more recent phenomena such as the 
boom in IT and related services cannot have been the original source of India’s economic 
growth.     
 
We present in this paper a somewhat different interpretation of India’s experience.  We argue 
that the trigger for India’s economic growth was an attitudinal shift on the part of the national 
government in 1980 in favor of private business.  The rhetoric of the reigning Congress Party 
until that time had been all about socialism and pro-poor policies.  When Indira Gandhi 
returned to power in 1980, she re-aligned herself politically with the organized private sector 
and dropped her previous rhetoric. The national government’s attitude towards business went 
from being outright hostile to supportive. Indira’s switch was further reinforced, in a more 
explicit manner, by Rajiv Gandhi following his rise to power in 1984.  This, in our view, was 
the key change that unleashed the animal spirits of the Indian private sector in the early 
1980s. 
 
It is important to characterize appropriately this attitudinal change that took place in the early 
1980s.  We make a distinction here between a pro-market and a pro-business orientation. The 
former focuses on removing impediments to markets, and aims to achieve this through 
economic liberalization.  It favors entrants and consumers.  A pro-business orientation, on the 
other hand, is one that focuses on raising the profitability of the established industrial and 
commercial establishments.  It tends to favor incumbents and producers.  Easing restrictions 
on capacity expansion for incumbents, removing price controls, and reducing corporate taxes 
(all of which took place during the 1980s) are examples of pro-business policies, while trade 
liberalization (which did not take place in any significant form until the 1990s) is the 
archetypal market-oriented policy.  This distinction can be observed, for example, in the 
contrasting approaches towards reform in East Asia and Latin America.  South Korea’s 
reforms in the 1960s and 1970s were primarily pro-business rather than pro-markets.  Latin 
America’s reforms in the 1990s were primarily pro-market.  
 
The change in India in the early 1980s are accordingly best described as pro-business rather 
than pro-market.  True liberalization was by and large anathema to organized business at the 
time.  Indira Gandhi was far less interested in opening up the economy and removing 
impediments to competition than in garnering political support from existing business  3 
 
 
groups.  Rajiv Gandhi, who was somewhat more prone to liberalize, had to step back when 
he reached too far out of line and when the Bofors scandal undermined his effectiveness.  
The primary beneficiaries of growth were therefore incumbents and pre-existing activities 
rather than entrants and new activities.  Nevertheless, we view this shift towards a pro-
business orientation as the essential trigger that set off the boom of the 1980s.  That this was 
a powerful trigger can be deduced from the  fact that the genuine liberalization after 1991 
added very little to aggregate economic performance.  Apparently, this attitudinal shift was in 
itself a very powerful stimulant for economic growth, even in the presence of price and other 
market distortions.   
 
That an attitudinal change on the part of the national leadership could have such a strong 
impact on growth is in turn grounded in India’s initial conditions.  India has very strong 
political and economic institutions for a country at its income level.  It is a democracy where 
the rule of law generally prevails and property rights are protected adequately.  Judged by 
cross-country norms, it ought to have a level of income that is several times higher.  The 
implication is that relatively minor changes in the policy environment can produce a large 
growth impact.  We interpret the suspension of the national government’s hostility to the 
private sector as one of these changes, something that left little paper trail in actual policies 
but had an important impact on investors’ psychology.   
 
We begin this paper by documenting India’s growth transition in the 1980s and placing this 
experience in comparative context.  We show that this transition is grounded in an impressive 
increase in productivity (rather than in factor accumulation).  We also show that India has 
moved from being a global underperformer before 1980 to a strong overperformer since then.  
 
We next present a series of possible explanations for this shift and show that none of them 
can satisfactorily account for the boom of the early 1980s.  There was not much liberalization 
in the 1980s, and the little that took place happened during the second half of the 1980s.  The 
Indian economy remained closed to world trade, and in some ways more protected than ever.  
The Green Revolution is unlikely to have been the source of the boom in non-agricultural 
activity, because we do not observe the requisite changes in the internal terms of trade.  
Demand-side explanations are inadequate to explain the rise in productivity.  Public sector 
investment is unlikely to have been the story either, unless we make demanding assumptions 
on time lags.   
 
We then lay out our own explanation, and provide some empirical evidence in support of it.  
We show in particular that post-1980 growth was strongest in activities and states that were 
most advantaged by the national government’s attitudinal shift—namely in the formal 
manufacturing sector built up under the earlier policy regime.  Hence to some extent, the 
learning generated under the earlier policy regime and the modern manufacturing base 
created thereby provided a permissive environment for eventual takeoff once the policy 
stance softened vis-à-vis the private sector. So, unlike what one may have otherwise expected 
(from accounts of how costly ISI was), growth occurred where the earlier investments had 
been made.  
  4 
 
 
Our analysis focuses on the transition to high growth in the 1980s, and we have little to say 
about the 1991 reforms and the experience of the 1990s.  We take the view that igniting 
growth and sustaining it are distinct challenges, requiring different sets of policies and 
approaches (Rodrik 2003, Hausmann et al. 2004).  This paper is concerned exclusively with 
the challenge of igniting growth and the story of how India seems to have overcome it.   
 
I.   THE FACTS 
A key fact that we establish at the outset of this paper is that the turnaround in this 
performance—the decisive break with the Hindu past—occurred around 1980 and not in the 
1990s as most accounts have it.  We are not the first to make this point:  De Long (2003) and 
Williamson and Zagha (2002) have both emphasized that the approximate doubling of 
India’s growth rate took place a full decade before the 1991 reforms.  Nonetheless, it is 
impossible to read the standard policy-oriented accounts and not leave with the impression 
that it is the reforms of the 1990s that have brought superlative economic performance to 
India (Ahluwalia, 2002; Srinivasan and Tendulkar, 2003).   
 
Chart 1 illustrates that three measures related to aggregate growth performance—real GDP 
per capita, real GDP per worker, and total factor productivity—displayed a sharp upward 
trend beginning 1980 after remaining virtually flat for the preceding two decades.  Table 1 
confirms that the pick-up in labor and total factor productivity between the 1970s and 1980s 
amounted to about 3 percentage points.  While the 1990s continued to see strong growth, the 
productivity measures show a deceleration between the 1980s and 1990s of between 0.3 and 
0.6 percentage points.
3  Regardless of whether the 1990s were slightly worse (or slightly 
better) than the 1980s, it is abundantly clear that India’s economic performance improved 
sharply sometime around 1980.
4   
 
More formal evidence that the break occurred around 1980 comes from a variety of sources.  
First, using the procedure described in Bai and Perron (1998, 2003), we computed the 
optimal one, two, and three break points for the growth rate of four series:
 per capita GDP 
computed at constant dollars (World Bank) and at PPP prices (PWT), GDP per worker 
(PWT), and total factor productivity (Bosworth and Collins, 2003).
5 In all four cases, we find 
                                                 
3 Micro-level evidence is also consistent with the absence of any significant break associated 
with the reforms of 1991.  Deaton and Dreze (2002) show that measures of poverty 
reduction, real wage growth, health and education exhibit trends in the 1990s similar to those 
prior to the 1990s.     
4 We note that this improvement is also evident when Indian GDP is expressed in PPP terms 
(i.e., using Penn World Tables data).  So it cannot be argued that the pickup in growth is  
artificial due to the interaction of price distortions with differential sectoral expansion.  
5 We thank Andy Berg and Marcos Souto for suggesting and estimating this procedure.  For 
the case of a single break, the Bai and Perron procedure minimizes the sum of squared 
(continued)  5 
 
 
that the single break occurs in 1979.
6  Second, Hausmann et al. (forthcoming) have analyzed 
transitions to high growth in a large cross-national sample, and date the Indian growth 
transition in 1982.
7  Finally, Wallack (2003) has analyzed GDP and its disaggregated 
components for structural breaks.  She finds evidence for a break in the GDP growth rate in 
the early to mid-1980s.  The highest value of the F-statistic associated with the existence of a 
break is reached in 1980 (Wallack 2003, p. 4314).
8   
 
Was this improved aggregate productivity performance since the 1980s simply a 
consequence of re-allocation of resources from low-productivity (agriculture) to higher 
productivity (manufacturing and services) or was there a trend improvement in the 
performance of individual sectors?  There has been a substantial structural change in the 
composition of the labor force employed in the three major sectors, with the most 
pronounced one being the decline in agriculture’s share of about 10 percentage points 
between 1975 and 1995, offset by an increase in the share of services (about 7.5 percentage 
points) and industry (2.5 percentage points). But this shift explains a very small fraction (less 
than 10 percent) of the improvement in economy-wide productivity.  For example, when the 
aggregate labor productivity growth is computed with fixed (base-period) employment 
shares, the pick-up in the 1980s is between 2.6 and 2.9 percentage points, and the 
deceleration in the 1990s about 0.4-0.6 percentage points (Table 1).   
 
A number of studies have argued that manufacturing experienced a surge in productivity in 
the 1980s (Ahluwalia, 1995, Unel, 2003) although some of these estimates have been 
contested (Hulten and Srinivasan, 1999; and Balakrishnan and Pushpagandan, 1994).
9 For 
                                                                                                                                                       
deviations of the growth rate around the means of the two resulting subsamples. For multiple 
breaks, we use the method described in Bai and Perron (2003), which employs a dynamic 
programming algorithm to compare all possible combinations, so that a minimum global sum 
of squared residuals is achieved.  Details are available from the authors upon request.   
6 The two breaks occurred in 1970 and 1979, and the three breaks occurred in 1970, 1979, 
and 1994 (with the procedure suggesting that there was a trend decline after 1994).   
7 The Hausmann et al. filter looks for a year such that the growth rate in the seven years 
following it is at least 2 percentage points or more higher than the growth rate in the prior 
seven years. 
 
8 She finds less evidence for a break in growth rates in specific sectors (such as 
manufacturing and agriculture), attributing the post-1980 growth to the changing 
composition of GDP.  Note that Wallack's study focuses on value added and not productivity. 
 
9 Hulten and Srinivasan (1999) make the point that conventional TFP measures understate 
the true contribution of productivity performance by ignoring the additional capital formation 
induced by an increase in productivity.  Balakrishnan and Pushpagandan’s (1994) critique is 
based on the failure of conventional measures to use separate deflators for gross output and 
(continued)  6 
 
 
example, Ahluwalia’s (1995) figures suggest that the increase in TFP growth during 1981-89 
over the previous two decades was 3.2 percentage points.   
 
A break in growth performance is also suggested by the evidence on economic growth at the 
level of the Indian states. Chart 2 plots per capita GDP for all states for every ten years 
beginning in 1960.  Beginning in 1980, there is both an upward trend in the average as well 
as a wider spread in the distribution of incomes. A more formal test of (unconditional) 
convergence between states for the four decades confirms this break (Table 2). For the 1960s 
and 1970s, the convergence coefficient is positive and insignificant.  For the 1980s and 
1990s, this coefficient increases and becomes statistically significant. The magnitude of the 
coefficient suggests that in the latter two decades, states are diverging at an annual rate of 
about 1.2 percent a year, very much a case of  “Divergence, Big Time” (Pritchett 1997). 
 
The surge in India’s performance since the 1980s is also confirmed by cross-national 
evidence. Table 3 provides basic data on the average growth rates and their volatility for the 
four decades since the 1960s for India, China, and the other regional groupings (Bosworth-
Collins, 2003). For the period, 1960-80, India’s growth rate of output per worker, at 1.3 
percent per year, is the lowest in the world except for sub-Saharan Africa.  For the next two 
decades, however, its average growth exceeds, by a substantial margin, all other regions, 
except East Asia.   
 
Table 4 presents simple Barro-type cross-country growth regressions for the periods 1960-80 
and 1980-99, using the data in Bosworth and Collins (2003). Two measures of growth 
performance—labor and total factor productivity—are regressed on a standard set of 
controls, including the convergence term. We introduce an India dummy in all these 
regressions to capture India’s performance relative to the average country in the sample.  For 
both productivity measures, the coefficient on the India dummy is negative and significant 
for the 1960-80 regressions but turns positive and significant for the period 1980-99. The 
TFP regressions suggest that, after controlling for policies, endowments, and initial income, 
India grew 0.7 percent per year slower than the average country in the 1960-80 period, but 
grew 2.1 percent per year faster than the average country in the 1980-99 period. These results 
indicate that India’s turnaround is not a consequence of merely catching-up. In the cross-
section, the magnitude of over-performance in the latter period has been substantial and 
exceeds the magnitude of under-performance in the 1960-80 period. 
 
Table 3 also sheds light on the variability of India’s growth in the various decades in absolute 
and relative terms.  India’s growth has not been more variable than other developing regions 
in the period 1960-80: indeed, it has the lowest standard deviation amongst all regions 
although the coefficient of variation is higher than for the Middle East, Latin America, and 
                                                                                                                                                       
intermediates in arriving at TFP measures.  Another study (RBI, 2004), using the double 
deflation methodology, however, shows that manufacturing TFP grew at 3.9 percent in the 
1980s and declined to 2.1 percent in the 1990s.  7 
 
 
Asia.  Between 1980 and 1999, however, India’s growth exhibits the lowest variation in 
terms of both the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation. Thus, India 
outperformed all regions, save East Asia, in terms of average growth, and outperformed all 
regions, including East Asia, in terms of the stability of growth.
10  Interestingly, and contrary 
to some claims, Indian growth was more stable in the 1980s than in the 1990s. 
 
A really striking feature about the Indian performance that emerges from the cross-national 
comparison is the respective contributions of capital accumulation and total factor 
productivity growth to overall labor productivity growth (Table 5). Prior to 1980, the 
contribution of TFP growth to overall labor productivity growth, at 10 percent, was lower in 
India than in any other region, except the Middle East: even sub-Saharan Africa fared better. 
Since 1980, however, India almost tops the list for TFP contribution to overall growth. 
Nearly 60 percent of overall growth was accounted for by TFP, a feature matched only by 
China.  Amazingly, the Indian TFP performance in 1980-99 surpasses that of East Asia even 
in the first twenty years of the East Asian miracle.  Evidently, India has relied less on 
deferred gratification and more on productivity to motor its growth even compared to the 
fast-growing countries of East Asia. If productivity-based growth is more sustainable than 
accumulation-based growth, it would appear that India’s future prospects appear quite 
promising.   
 
II.   THE EXPLANATIONS THAT DON’T WORK 
What explains the dramatic rise in India’s growth, and in particular its productivity, 
performance since 1980? In this section, we discuss a number of explanations that could 
explain this turnaround, including those that have been put forward by recent studies. For the 
most part, we argue that these explanations are inadequate or unsatisfactory in some way.  In 
the next section, we propose some alternative hypotheses for which we provide some direct 
and indirect evidence. 
 
India’s performance in the 1980s has elicited a number of distinct explanations. We consider 
each in turn.  
 
A.   Was it a Favorable External Environment? 
The first explanation that we need to consider is whether the improved productivity 
performance was simply a consequence of a more favorable external environment. There is 
very little to suggest that such a factor was at play.  On the whole, the 1980s did not present a 
hospitable environment for developing countries, something that can be readily gauged by 
                                                 
10 India’s superior performance on the variability of growth in the 1980-99 period is 
confirmed in simple cross-section regressions (available from the authors upon request).  8 
 
 
the slowdown in growth pretty much everywhere (with the notable exception of China).
11 
The long decline in industrial country productivity began with the oil shocks of the 1970s. 
Chart 3 plots the temporal evolution of India’s terms of trade, which is a gauge of external 
environmental conditions. It turns out that since 1960, the terms of trade were most 
unfavorable for India in the 1980s, during which period they declined by about 20 percent 
relative to the previous period. This, of course, only serves to deepen the mystery of the 
1980s productivity performance because it appeared to have occurred at a time when 




B.   Aggregate Demand and the Unsustainability of 1980s Growth 
A common argument used in downplaying the growth of the 1980s is that it was led by fiscal 
expansion and hence unsustainable. This view is expressed clearly, for example, in 
Ahluwalia (2002) and Srinivasan and Tendulkar (2003).
13 
 
“This (the 1990s) growth record is only slightly better than the annual average of 5.7 percent 
in the 1980s, but it can be argued that the 1980s growth was unsustainable, fuelled by a 
buildup of external debt that culminated in the crisis of 1991.  In sharp contrast, growth in the 
1990s was accompanied by remarkable external stability despite the east Asian crisis.” 
(Ahluwalia, 2002, p. 67). 
 
“The fiscal expansionism of the 1980s, accompanied by some liberalization of controls on 
economic activity, generated real GDP growth of more than 5.8 percent a year... This 
expansionism, however, was not sustainable and led to the macroeconomic crisis of 1991. 
(Srinivasan and Tendulkar, 2003, p. 9). 
 
This Keynesian-run-amok explanation is, at first blush, supported by the data. During the 
1970s, the average consolidated government deficit averaged 5 percent of GDP. During the 
1980s, this had soared to 9 percent, an annual increase of 4 percentage points. But the fiscal 
expansion has two distinct consequences, relating respectively to its unsustainability and its 
impact on productivity, which the quotes above fail to distinguish.  Indeed, the two 
consequences work at cross-purposes with each other.  
 
                                                 
11 For example, the real price of oil was 15 percent higher in the 1980s than in the 1970s (and 
nearly 75 percent higher than in the 1990s); and industrial country growth averaged 3.5 
percent in the 1970s versus 3.2 percent in the 1980s.  
12 By the same token, the 1990s productivity performance looks less impressive. 
13 See also Chopra et. al. (1995).  9 
 
 
Fiscal expansion can lead to rising current account deficits, and hence to a build-up of 
external debt which in the Indian case proved to be unsustainable, triggering the crisis of 
1991.  But the more this happens, i.e., the more the fiscal expansion “leaks abroad” and leads 
to a debt build-up, the less the demand that is generated for domestic goods and services, and 
the less likely that measured productivity increases could have resulted.  It is because the 
current account deficit did not deteriorate one-for-one relative to the fiscal impulse (the 
current account deficit was about 1.7 percentage points higher during the 1980s than the 
1970s), that the demand explanation has potential traction for explaining productivity 
growth.  
 
The component of fiscal expansion that leads to increased demand for domestic goods and 
services, can explain output growth over short periods, strictly speaking relative to trend, but 
it is not clear how it can explain a large and sustained rise in trend productivity.  The only 
possible explanation would rely on sustained differences in capacity utilization across time. 
A demand expansion can then increase output, which in the presence of idle capacity, would 
also show up in the measured productivity aggregates. One way to control for such a 
demand-induced increase in productivity is to compute the productivity aggregates 
incorporating changes in capacity utilization. In the Indian case, this argument would suggest 
that the TFP measures for the 1970s and 1980s should be corrected for capacity utilization. 
 
Data on capacity utilization in Indian manufacturing for the period under consideration are 
produced by different sources and are difficult to reconcile.  For example, for the 1970s, the 
World Bank (1995) reports an estimate of 72.7 percent while Ahluwalia’s (1990) numbers 
yield an estimate of 77.6 percent.  Estimates for the 1980s are similarly dispersed. One 
consistent estimate for the 1970s and 1980s (World Bank, 1995) implies an increase in 
capacity utilization of about 2.7 percent, which would have the effect of reducing measured 
TFP growth in the 1980s by about 1 percent per year.
14  Even on the strong assumption that 
all this change in capacity is demand-induced, the turnaround in TFP growth between the 
1970s and 1980s would remain substantial (about 2-2.2 percent per year). Of course, the 
turnaround in labor productivity growth would remain unaffected by changes in capacity 
utilization. 
 
More broadly, however, the explanation of increased demand is likely to be unsatisfactory or 
incomplete because the break in the 1980s that we have presented (i) related to a number of 
productivity aggregates, and not just at aggregate but also at the level of the states; (ii) 
appeared to hold not just in a time series context for India but also in the cross-section; and 
(iii) even on the most favorable interpretation, cannot account for a large share of the 
trunaround.  A lot remains unexplained. 
 
                                                 
14 Effectively, the contribution of capital accumulation to labor productivity growth is 
increased by an amount equal to the percentage increase in capacity utilization multiplied by 
the share of capital in output (assumed to be 0.35).  10 
 
 
C.   External Liberalization 
Was the pickup in India’s trend productivity growth in the 1980s caused by external 
liberalization?  We present below evidence--relating to trade policies and trade outcomes—
which paint a remarkably consistent picture of little, if any, liberalization taking place during 
the 1980s, significant liberalization taking place in the 1990s, with its full effects being felt  
in the late 1990s. 
 
Table 6 below, based on Das (2003), presents data on the actual trade policy reform that was 
carried out since the early 1980s.  We can see that during the early 1990s, trade protection 
declined unambiguously and markedly. However, during the 1980s, protection through tariffs 
(measured in terms of effective protection) increased, and protection through quantitative 
restrictions (measured in terms of the coverage of these restrictions) declined only 
marginally. This is true for manufacturing as a whole and for the different use-based sectors. 
It is important to note here that these numbers likely understate the increase in effective 
protection for final/consumer goods for much of the 1980s and 1990s stemming from the 
liberalization, albeit limited, of the capital goods sector. 
 
This broad pattern of trade policy reform is confirmed by the data on tariff collections and by 
data related to trade outcomes. Chart 4 illustrates that duties collected as a share of imports 
and GDP rose substantially during the 1980s, peaking in the early 1990s. Duty collection as a 
share of imports rose from over 30 percent in the early 1980s to nearly 45 percent in the late 
1980s.  As a share of GDP, duty collections declined steadily only after the mid-1990s. The 
chart also computes a broader measure of trade protection—the anti-export bias—which 
incorporates the export subsidies granted to manufacturing under various schemes.  
Incorporating export subsidies reduces the level of protection but confirms the pattern of 
sharply rising protection during the 1980s. In 1991, the important export subsidies were 
eliminated, which imparted a one-off increase to the level of overall protection.  
 
The pattern of trade outcomes is also consistent with the pattern of trade protection (see 
Chart 5 and table below).  
 
 1970s  1980s  1990s 
Annual growth of non-
oil import volume 
1.1% 2.8%  12.9% 
Annual growth of 
export volume 
4.6% 4.0%  10.7% 
Openness ratio  9.8%  12.7%  19.3% 
 Crude outcome indicators such as the openness ratio tell a story of modest increases in 
openness during the 1970s and 1980s of 1.5 and 2.2 percentage points, respectively over the 
preceding decades followed by a more dramatic increase of 6.6 percentage points in the  11 
 
 
1990s.  The same is true for import and export volumes: export volumes grew at a slower 
pace in the 1980s than in the 1970s. 
 
These indicators have the usual problem of leaving open the question of the causes of the 
increase in openness. A more sophisticated way of assessing trade outcomes is to use a 
gravity model, which controls for many of the possible determinants of trade.  Table 7 
presents the estimated coefficients for India and China dummies in gravity estimations for 
the period 1980 to 2000 based on the dataset and methodology used in Subramanian and Wei 
(2003). The India dummy is negative and significant for all periods except in 2000, with the 
value of the dummy increasing in absolute value through the 1980s, and starting to decline 
only in the mid-1990s, consistent with the timing of the trade policy reform. If the results are 
to be taken at face value, they suggest that India only become a normal trader in 2000.  In 
contrast, the China dummy is positive and significant for most of the 1980-2000 period.  
 
External liberalization could also encompass exchange rate changes that could have an 
impact on trade and productivity. Chart 6 depicts the movement in India’s real exchange rate 
since 1970. After remaining broadly unchanged during the first half of the 1980s, the rupee 
experienced a large real depreciation of over 40 percent in the second half of the 1980s. 
Could this have caused the productivity spurt?  In terms of timing, the real depreciation 
followed the pick-up in productivity growth in the early 1980s.  But could it have contributed 
to sustaining this spurt in the late 1980s? 
 
We would argue that exchange rate changes are an unlikely candidate. First, a real 
depreciation boosts aggregate demand and while it could have increased output growth in the 
short-term, its consequences for raising long-run productivity growth are less clear.  Of 
course, a real depreciation could have an effect on overall productivity through an import 
substitution-induced reallocation effect: if tradables are generally more productive than the 
rest of the economy, raising the share of tradable goods in overall GDP can result in an  
economy-wide productivity increase. In India, the share of manufacturing in GDP is small, 
and more importantly, the increase in this share in the aftermath of the real depreciation was 
too small to help explain overall productivity growth.
15   
 
D.   Was it the Green Revolution? 
Another possible explanation for the growth pickup in the 1980s is agriculture, which 
witnessed an increase in labor productivity growth from 0.1 percent in the 1970s to 2.6 
percent in the 1980s. The difficulty with agriculture as the source of the improvement in 
overall performance is fourfold.  First, in quantitative terms, the turnaround in agriculture’s 
performance was actually less impressive than that in manufacturing and services, where the 
acceleration in productivity growth was actually larger. Second, if rising agricultural 
                                                 
15 Between 1986 and 1992, the share of manufacturing in GDP remained unchanged at about 
16 percent.  12 
 
 
productivity were the underlying cause for improved productivity performance elsewhere in 
the economy, a necessary condition that would have to be met is a deterioration in the 
agricultural terms of trade. This classic “Preobrazhensky effect” relies on improved 
productivity driving down agricultural prices and releasing resources for use in 
manufacturing.  But as Chart 7 illustrates, quite the converse happened.  During the 1980s, 
the terms of trade of agriculture with respect to industry and manufacturing actually 
improved.  Moreover, as we showed above, the sectoral reallocation brought about by 
improved agricultural productivity performance would be too small to explain improvements 
in overall productivity.  Third, recent work by Burgess and Venables (2003) and Foster and 
Rosenzweig (2003) shows that agricultural productivity plays a comparatively small role in 
explaining the inter-state variation in total, urban, and surprisingly, even rural poverty.
16 It is 
non-farm productivity that appears to be the driver of aggregate outcomes.  Finally, in our 
econometric analysis described below, we too found no evidence of a role for agriculture in 
explaining the overall productivity improvement. 
 
E.   Was it Public Investment? 
The period between the late 1970s and the late-1980s witnessed a marked rise in public 
investment of about 4 percentage points of GDP (Chart 8). Could this have played a role in 
accounting for the 1980s productivity performance? It should be emphasized that the impact 
of public investment via its demand-creating effects cannot be an explanation for reasons 
outlined in section A above. But public investment could have augmented the supply 
capacity of the economy through its spillover effects. 
 
A useful framework for analyzing the growth or productivity-enhancing role of public 
investment is provided by Barro (1990).  Conceptually, certain government services (notably 
those related to infrastructure) have a productive role if they are inputs in private production. 
This can be incorporated in a standard Cobb-Douglas production function to yield:  
 




where Y and K are expressed in per worker terms. G is the flow of government services in 
infrastructure (i.e., excluding output
 
of government enterprises).  The parameter α is the  
productivity of public services relative to private services (which should theoretically be  
close to the average tax rate, about 15 percent in the case of India.).  In turn, this yields the  
growth accounting decomposition: 
 
y – k – a = α/(1- α) (g/y)  
 
where the lower case variables are the proportional rate of growth analogues of the 
underlying variables. This equation makes clear that the standard growth accounting 
                                                 
16 At the level of the states, agricultural growth and overall growth are negatively correlated.  13 
 
 
decomposition could overestimate total factor productivity growth if the spillover effects of 
government investment are ignored. Given data on government investment, we can compute 
the possible contribution of government services to overall growth for given values of α.  The 
results of this exercise are illustrated in Tables 8A and 8B.  Under the assumption that the 
effects of public investment are contemporaneous or that only the infrastructure component 
of public investment is productivity enhancing, we estimate that the contribution of public 
investment to overall growth is quite small (0.2%-0.3%). If, on the other hand, the effects are 
lagged (by say 5 years), public infrastructure investment, and especially total public 
spending, could explain a substantial part of overall growth (1.5%-2.9%).  The bottom line is 
that the surge in public investment could in principle explain India’s growth in the 1980s, but 
only if we make an appropriate assumption about the nature of the lags between public 
investment and its productivity-enhancing effects. 
 
F.   Was it “Internal” Liberalization? 
A promising candidate for explaining the 1980s turnaround is what in India is called “internal 
liberalization.”  This relates to the dismantling of the vast controls on domestic investment 
and competition implemented through a Kafka-esque array of licences, regulations and other 
forms of control. 
 
We discuss these in greater detail below, but for the purposes of our narrative it is enough to 
note at this stage that the timing and magnitude of internal liberalization are not quite 
compatible with a productivity take-off in the early 1980s. Indeed, contemporaneous 
accounts of these internal reforms make clear the limited range of liberalization that was 
attempted.  In what is probably the best account of this period, Joshi and Little (1994, pp. 71-
72) express this sentiment as follows: 
 
“In summary, liberalization in our period (1964/65-1990/91) consisted of little more than the 
piecemeal deregulation of industrial licensing and the introduction of a measure of exchange 
rate flexibility. These changes were not trivial and did improve economic performance.  But 
ideology and vested interests prevented any significant action in the more difficult areas such 
as trade liberalization, financial liberalization, and reform of the labor market and public 
sector enterprises.” 
 
Srinivasan and Tendulkar (2003, p2) imply the same when they talk of the ”shift in 1991 
from an inward-oriented, state-led development strategy to a policy of active reintegration 
with the world economy” (our italics).  
 
Others have, however, drawn attention to the important steps taken between 1985 and 1988, 
under Rajiv Gandhi, to dismantle the industrial licensing system in India. We shall describe 
these in greater detail below but a rough magnitude of the importance of these steps can be 
gauged by the assessment that in 1991, prior to the sweeping deregulatory effort, between 60  14 
 
 
percent and 80 percent of industry was still subject to licensing and controls.
17 Thus, the 
magnitude of the reform effort not only seems modest, but it also lags behind the turnaround 
in the productivity surge. 
 
 
III.   POSSIBLE EXPLANATION 
So what explains the Indian growth take-off in the early 1980s? In this section, we propose 
an alternative explanation and offer some econometric evidence  in support.  First, a few 
points on our data set and approach, which rely largely on exploiting variations in 
performance between the 21 states for which we have data. Accordingly, we use state-level 
data for the period 1960-2000 which is disaggregated by 17 sectors in the national income 
accounts.  For one of these sectors—manufacturing—data are also available for the output of 
the registered and unregistered sectors. These data have been compiled and recently released 
by the Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation.  We created a panel dataset 
with variables defined for four decades—1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Since we are 
interested in changes in impact across these decades, particularly in the 1980s, we interacted 
the explanatory variables with the appropriate decadal dummies.  Data on the political 
variables were gathered from the website of the Election Commission of India 
(http://www.eci.gov.in/infoeci/key_stat/keystat_fs.htm) and supplemented by state-level 
sources.    
 
Our explanation comprises four elements.  First, that there was an attitudinal change on the 
part of the government in the 1980s, signalling a shift in favor of the private sector, with this 
shift validated in a very haphazard and gradual manner through actual policy changes. 
Second, this shift and the limited policy changes were pro-business rather than pro-
competition, aimed primarily at benefiting incumbents in the formal industrial and 
commercial sectors. Third, these small shifts elicited a large productivity response because 
India was far away from its income possibility frontier. Finally, manufacturing, which was 
built up through previous efforts, played a key role in determining the responses to the shifts.  
 
We posit that sometime in the early 1980s there was a significant attitudinal change towards 
the private sector on the part of the national government, led by Indira Gandhi’s Congress 
Party.  Congress went from being hostile to private business
18 to mildly supportive, and 
                                                 
17 The 60 percent estimate is due to Chopra et. al. (1995, Table 7.6, p. 60), while the 80 
percent estimate is due to Hasan (1997, p. 27).  Also, data compiled by Balakrishnan and 
Babu (2003) suggest that gross margins in industry did not decline in the 1980s relative to the 
1970s. 
18 Basu (2003) describes the general attitude of mistrust towards business in post-colonial 
India, tracing it back to India’s experience with the East India Company and the trader 
mentality of the colonial rulers.      15 
 
 
eventually quite supportive. This change was inaugurated with the return of a much-
chastened Indira Gandhi to political power in the 1980s after a three-year rule by the Janata 
party.  It gathered momentum (after her assassination) under Rajiv Gandhi.  The 
transformation has some antecedents in the 1970s, as reflected for example in the 
appointment of a high-level committees to propose changes to the trade regime and to 
industrial licensing.  One important manifestation of this change, noted by Joshi and Little 
(1994), was the fact that import controls were not tightened in the wake of the balance of 
payments crisis in 1979/80.  
 
But the attitudinal change was grounded primarily in political calculation, and not in a desire 
to enhance the efficiency of the economic regime.  As Kohli (1989) notes, Indira’s main 
objective was to counter the perceived threat posed by the Janata party, which had trounced 
Congress in the Hindi heartland in the 1977 elections.  Her political rhetoric consequently 
became less secular and populist and more communal and private-sector oriented.  In Kohli’s 
words, “in India’s political culture … the two packages of secularism and socialism and 
Hindu chauvinism and pro-business have tended to offer two alternative legitimacy formulae 
for mobilizing political support” (1989, 308).  After 1980, Indira dropped the first package in 
favor of the second.  From our perspective, what is particularly important is that Indira now 
actively sought to woo the business and industrial establishment.            
 
As we have already noted, there were few significant policy changes in the early 1980s, and 
the changes later on (beginning in 1985) were restricted largely to some internal 
liberalization relating to the relaxation of industrial licensing.  The limited nature of these 
changes, as well as the form that they took, is best understood by appreciating the political 
logic of Indira’s (and later Rajiv’s) efforts.  These were aimed to gather support from the 
business establishment rather than to alienate them.  Hence there was more action where 
business support existed—for example, in reducing taxes, easing access to imported capital 
inputs, or liberalizing capacity restrictions—than where it did not—for example, in external 
liberalization.   
 
As we have noted, most observers agree that the actual policy framework did not change 
significantly until 1991.  That is why we describe the shift as an “attitudinal” one, having to 
do with the government’s attitude towards business and the private sector, rather than as 
policy reform per se.  This shift had more to do with currying favor with existing business 
interests (essentially large, politically influential firms in the formal manufacturing sector) 
than with liberalizing the system as a whole.   
 
We explore the  implications of the first two elements of our explanation: if the causal 
mechanism is a shift in the attitudes of the national government, we should see differences in 
growth rates depending on the nature of the political alliance between state governments and 
the national government.  In particular, growth post-1980 should be more pronounced in 
states where the ruling government was in alliance with the national government (mostly 
Congress in this period) than where it was not.  To test for this, we coded state governments 
according to the party in power and constructed variables for each of the decades depending  16 
 
 
on the number of years the party ruling in a state was either the same as, or had an alliance 
with, the party in power at the centre. Table 9 displays the results. 
 
As column 1 shows, states that were allied with the national government had growth rates in 
the 1960s and 1970s that were indistinguishable from others’.  This changes dramatically in 
the 1980s and 1990s—when states allied with the national government had dramatically 
higher growth rates.
19  We would expect the change in policy attitudes to have a particularly 
marked effect on the formal sectors of the economy because as explained above both the 
attitudinal and policy shifts were in their favor. So in column 3 we look more narrowly at the 
growth of registered manufacturing.  As expected, states that were allied with the national 
government had significantly higher growth rates in registered manufacturing in the 1980s.
20  
Column 4 analyzes the difference between growth rates in registered and unregistered 
manufacturing, on the theory that an attitudinal shift towards business should have a larger 
impact on registered than unregistered businesses.
21  Once again, we find this intuition 
confirmed: states that were allied with the national government experienced differentially 
higher growth rates in registered manufacturing.
22   
 
In addition to the differential impact on formal manufacturing, another suggestive piece of 
evidence in support of the proposition that the shift was pro-business comes from investment 
behavior.  While aggregate private investment does not increase greatly in the 1980s, there is 
a striking shift in the early 1980s in private investment towards corporate sector investment 
(and away from the household sector, comprising largely unincorporated enterprises).  Figure 
8 shows the corporate-sector investment rate rising by about 2-3 percentage points in the 
1980s. It looks like the corporate form of investment became considerably safer sometime in 
the early 1980s.  
 
We turn next to the third element. Why did this apparently small trigger elicit such large 
productivity responses? It is worth noting at the outset that India was very far from its long 
                                                 
19 This result holds whether the political variable is defined as parties being allied to that in 
the centre or as being the same as that in the centre. 
20 Column 2 reports results when this political variable is interacted with the share of 
registered manufacturing. Again the coefficients for the 1980s and 1990s are positive and 
significant. 
21 The differential between the growth of the registered and unregistered sectors in aggregate 
was 4.3 percent in the 1980s compared with 1.7 percent in the 1970s. 
22 Interestingly, in the equation for registered manufacturing and for the difference in growth 
between registered and unregistered manufacturing, the political variable for the 1990s 
ceases to be significant.  This suggests that the impact of the 1990s liberalization was broader 
than that in the 1980s.  17 
 
 
run or steady-state level of income given the level of its domestic institutions. If the recent 
literature’s emphasis on the importance of institutions on development is correct, India 
appears to be far inside the possibility frontier.  Table 10 illustrates this under-achievement. 
It reports regressions of income on the deep determinants of income (based on Acemoglu et. 
al., 2001, and Rodrik et. al., 2002) with an India dummy.   
 
The first four columns report results where the institutional variable is economic while the 
last four columns contain political institutions as the relevant determinant of long run 
income. The estimated coefficient on the India dummy in both sets of regressions is negative 
and significant, suggesting that India is an outlier. The magnitude of the dummy coefficient 
is large: for example, column 1 suggests that in 1980, India’s level of income was about a 
quarter of what it should be given the strength of its economic institutions. On the other hand, 
if political institutions are the true long-run determinant of income, India’s income is about 
15 percent of what it should be. India has thus been a significant under-achiever in the sense 
that it has not exploited the potential created by having done the really hard work of building 
institutions. 
 
Next we turn to the role of manufacturing, and in particular registered (or formal) 
manufacturing, in mediating the changes. We begin by noting a very strong regularity in the 
data: starting in the 1980s, it is states with the largest formal manufacturing base (“registered 
manufacturing”) that take off.  Figure 9 shows how the simple correlation between growth 
and the share of registered manufacturing in total output, which is weakly negative in the 
1970s (rho=-.08), turns significantly positive in the 1980s (rho = 0.42).  Table 11 tests this 
more formally. When we introduce state-level registered manufacturing shares in the growth 
regression and allow the coefficients to vary by decade, not only are the shares for 1980s and 
1990s highly positive and significant, but also these variables can “knock out” the pure 
period dummies  (see columns 1-2).
23  In other words, whatever it is that happened in the 
early 1980s, it stimulated growth primarily in states with high level of formal manufacturing 
activities.   
 
We note also that this is not simply an artifact of the fact that it is the richer states that take 
off after 1980 (the richer ones also having in general larger manufactures shares).  Column 4 
shows that manufacturing shares are still significant for the 1980s, when period-specific 
convergence terms are added to the regression (while the latter are insignificant).  
 
The importance of the registered manufacturing sector in the productivity surge is confirmed 
in the robustness checks that we report in Table 12. In columns 1-4, we check whether 
agriculture or infrastructure, which account for a larger share of output than registered 
manufacturing, play a similarly important role. Not only are these variables insignificant on 
their own, they are also unable to “knock down” the significance of the decadal dummies. In 
                                                 
23 To minimize endogeneity-related problems, the beginning-period value of the share of 
registered manufacturing is used as the regressor.   18 
 
 
columns 5-7, we undertake a different kind of check on the role of manufacturing.  If the 
mechanism by which manufacturing was affecting overall GDP growth was spillovers, for 
example, in the form of human and managerial capital built up in industry and being applied 
elsewhere in the economy, it seems plausible that these spillovers should occur more in 
relation to services than agriculture. To test this, we change the dependent variable in 
columns 5-7 to per capita non-agricultural GDP growth. In all these specifications, the 
registered manufacturing variable for the 1980s is highly significant. Interestingly, the 
magnitude of this coefficient is more than twice its value in the specification with overall 
GDP as the dependent variable (Table 12, col. 3), suggesting that any spillover benefits from 
manufacturing are greater in the non-agricultural than in the agricultural sector. 
 
So these registered manufacturing shares are capturing something about the nature of the 
change that occurred.  The question is what. We interpret these findings in the following 
way.  It is reasonable to suppose that an anti-business attitude on the part of top political 
leaders entails a disproportionate “tax” on formally registered entities.  That is because these 
firms’ operations are intensive in transactions with the government (paying taxes, complying 
with regulations, seeking licenses, etc.)  When political attitudes become more pro-business, 
it is formal firms that should receive a particularly strong boost.  That is exactly how we read 
the results with respect to the registered manufacturing.   
 
We also show evidence that the labor regulation data recently compiled by Besley and 
Burgess (2002) has some traction for the turnaround in the 1980s.  We interpret this index as 
a measure of how pro-labor (and anti-business) the environment in different states was.  We 
find that the nature of these regulations in different states plays a role in explaining 
differential performance in the crucial decade of the 1980s (whether manufacturing shares 
are controlled or not—see columns 5 and 6 of Table 11). This once again is consistent with 
our hypothesis that what made the difference in the 1980s is a shift towards a more pro-
business stance. 
 
To sum up, the evidence points to an unleashing of the organized and incumbent private 
sector sometime in the early 1980s.  While it is impossible to pinpoint exactly the source for 
this, there is circumstantial evidence that the trigger was a shift in the national government’s 
attitude towards the private sector.  This evidence also indicates that the beneficiary of this 
attitudinal shift was the formal sector built up under the earlier policy regime.  Hence to 
some extent, the learning generated under the earlier policy regime and the modern 
manufacturing base created thereby provided a permissive environment for eventual takeoff 
once the policy stance softened vis-à-vis the private sector.  So, unlike what one may have 
otherwise expected (from accounts of how costly ISI was), growth occurred where the earlier 
investments had been made.  This is in contrast to the experience of the former socialist 
economies where post-transition growth was greatest where the drag exerted by the previous 
state sector was smallest.
24 
                                                 
24 Sachs and Woo (1997) argue that this drag was important in explaining the differential 





IV.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We believe that our findings raise a number of issues related to growth and, in particular, 
growth transitions. We would summarize them as follows.  
 
India’s growth transition began in the early 1980s rather than after the crisis of 1991. The 
performance of the 1980s cannot be explained by Keynesian pump priming because there is a 
variety of time-series and cross-section evidence pointing to trend improvements in 
productivity indicators. Equally, this transition was not triggered by implementing the 
conventional litany of Washington Consensus reforms because the transition occurred a full 
decade before such reforms were initiated. They appeared to have been triggered by a 
perception on the part of the private sector that the government’s attitude toward it had 
changed, a perception that was subsequently (in the mid-to-late 1980s), mildly validated by 
piecemeal reforms of the industrial licensing system. The attitudinal shift signaled by the 
Congress governments in the 1980s elicited a large productivity response, a phenomenon 
facilitated by the fact that India was far away from its income possibility frontier.  
 
Manufacturing, and in particular registered manufacturing, which had been built up in the 
previous decades, appears to have played an important role in determining which states took 
advantage of the changed attitude of the private sector. Thus, while the contemporaneous 
costs associated with these investments may have been high, they appear to have generated 
some spillover benefits in the post-1980 period.  
 
Most observers, focusing on the 1990s, and to some extent the 1980s have emphasized 
gradualism as the hallmark of the Indian approach to reforms in contrast with the shock 
therapy in some of the transition countries and the ambitious liberalization in Latin America 
since the mid-1980s (Ahluwalia, 2002). Equally important but somewhat neglected has been 
the approach to reforms adopted by India in the 1980s, where the distinctiveness has had 
arguably less to do with pace than with the manner and sequencing.  
 
We would stress that our characterization of the 1980s reform is not about whether  
“liberalization” took place but about how it happened. Some accounts of the 1980s point to 
the easing of access to foreign technology, to foreign capital goods, and to foreign direct 
investment (with the entry of Suzuki into the domestic car market as the most telling 
example) as examples of “liberalization.” To us, these reforms in the 1980s, were not pro-
liberalization but pro-business in the important sense that they served to boost the profits of 
existing businesses without threatening them with real competition. Allowing a single foreign 
firm, Suzuki, to enter the domestic car market under existing conditions of limited external 
liberalization (and subject to local content requirements) is very different from opening the 
domestic car market to all foreign producers, which is the normal liberalization strategy and  20 
 
 
the approach adopted in the 1990s.
25 This pro-business rather than pro-market/pro-
competition orientation manifested itself in the greater focus on “internal” rather than 
“external” reforms. In addition, even the internal reforms which favored business were 
slanted more toward favoring pre-existing activities rather than facilitating new businesses 
(i.e., through entry by domestic firms).
26  This approach had the political economy merit of 
avoiding the creation of losers.  And it appears that the economic impact of favoring existing 
activities, which must have entailed some inefficiency, was not only not negative but actually 
positive.  This is reflected in the fact that the growth of the 1990s also appears to have taken 
place in states with a large initial share of registered manufacturing, some of it built up 
during the 1980s.  Thus, India’s “reforms” in the 1980s, which essentially amounted to more 
import substitution, were attractive from a political economy perspective because they 
created virtually no losers. This is reminiscent of China’s reforms as well, although the latter 
obviously took on a very different form.   
 
But as in China, economic dynamism created a fertile environment not just for incumbents, 
but also for entrants and new activities.  It is perhaps not a coincidence that some of the IT 
powerhouses that would begin to fuel India’s growth a decade or so later got established in 
the early 1980s, just as the economic environment was turning more business-friendly.  For 
example, Wipro first ventured into IT in 1980, and Infosys was founded in 1981.  These 
firms eventually were able to reap handsome benefits from India’s prior public investments 
in higher education (the IITs in particular) once the policy environment turned permissive.  
Their story is in many ways similar to the one we have laid out for the more traditional 
activities during the 1980s: pre-existing strengths unleashed by more pro-business policy 
attitudes.    
 
What about the reforms of the 1990s?  It may well be the case that the performance of the 
1980s would have run out of steam and that the “true” reforms of the 1990s were essential to 
                                                 
25 Guaranteed profits were arguably why Suzuki accepted the onerous conditions--joint-
venture with the public sector, requirement to fulfill local content requirements—associated 
with its entry. 
26 The four major internal liberalization measures that were implemented in 1985 and 1986 
involved: (i) Eliminating the licensing of 25 categories of industries subject to certain fairly 
onerous conditions; (ii) extending delicensing to large companies in 22 industries which were 
previously restricted by the Monopolies and Trade Restrictive Practices Act (MRTP) and 
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA); (iii) allowing companies in 28 industries to 
expand the scope of their operations into related activities; and (iv) allowing companies that 
had reached 80 percent capacity utilization to expand their capacity upto 133 percent of that 
reached in any of the previous years. Apart from the first, all the remaining measures 
essentially allowed incumbents to operate more freely rather than facilitate the entry of new 
domestic firms and promote competition. Even the limited reduction in protection of capital 
goods industries served to increase the effective protection of incumbents in final goods 
industries.  21 
 
 
keep the productivity growth alive. The reforms of the 1990s were, of course, triggered by 
the crisis of 1991. The quick rebound from the crisis has been almost entirely attributed to 
the decisive break from the dirigiste past. But if the 1980s experience was as successful as 
we think it might have been in creating a strong base of manufacturing and productivity 
growth, it is hard not to draw the conclusion that the quick rebound was also rendered 
possible by the strength of the 1980s performance.
27  In some ways, although India was 
reforming in response to a macroeconomic crisis, it was reforming from a position of 
strength in the real sector of the economy. That might explain why the response to the 
reforms in India in the 1990s was so different from that in Latin America (or in sub-Saharan 
Africa). 
 
Finally, one consequence of the conventional story that we sketched out at the beginning—
that the 1990s marked the watershed for India—has been the unfortunate neglect of research 
on policies and performance in the 1980s.  We hope that this paper will kindle research 
interest in a number of very interesting issues relating to the 1980s, which could be important 
in deriving broader lessons for growth transitions across the world.  
 
                                                 
27 This is supported by cross-industry studies, which show that the positive impact of 
liberalization on productivity in the 1990s is small in magnitude (Topalova 2004).  22 
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Chart 2: Real Per Capita Net State Domestic Product, 1960-2000 
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   1960-70    1970-80    1980-90    1990-99
Bosworth-Collins (B-C)
Output 3.84 2.98 5.85 5.59
Output per worker (Q/L) 1.87 0.69 3.90 3.27
Capital per worker 0.83 0.61 1.06 1.32
Education 0.29 0.58 0.32 0.34
Total factor productivity (TFP) 0.74 -0.50 2.49 1.57
IMF
Output 3.75 3.16 5.64 5.61
Output per worker 1.77 0.86 3.69 3.30
Total factor productivity 1/ 1.17 0.47 2.89 2.44
Total factor productivity 2/ -0.94 -2.07 1.28 0.94
Disaggregated growth of Q/L based on current employment shares
Agriculture 3/ 1.20 0.13 2.57 1.29
Manufacturing 4/ 2.00 6.30 6.00
Services (B-C) 5/ 2.12 6.32 6.57
Services (IMF) 6/ 3.14 5.30 6.69
Growth rate of Aggregate Q/L  with base-period employment shares as weights
Aggregate (Bosworth-Collins)  0.69 3.66 3.08
Aggregate  (IMF)  0.86 3.49 3.11
Contribution of labor-shifts to aggregate Q/L growth
Aggregate (Bosworth-Collins)  n.a. 0.24 0.19
Aggregate  (IMF)  n.a. 0.20 0.19
Employment Share 7/ 1975 1985 1995
Agriculture 70.8 64.4 60.8
Industry 12.4 15.2 15.8
Services 16.8 20.4 23.4
Sources: Bosworth and Collins (2003); Ghose (1999); and authors' estimates
1/  Based on labor force
2/  Based on average years of schooling in population above 15 years of age
3/  From World Bank's World Development Indicators
4/  For 1980s and 1990s, data from IMF Working paper; for 1970s, estimate based on Ahulwahlia (1995) 
5/ Calculated as a residual by deducting weighted average sectoral productivity growth rates from B-C agg. Q/L growth rate
6/ Calculated as a residual by deducting weighted average sectoral productivity growth rates from IMF agg. Q/L growth rate
7/ Obtained from Ghose (1999). His number for 1977/78 is extrapolated backward to 1975 by applying trend between 
1977/78 and 1983 and his number for 1993-94 is extrapolated forward to 1995 by applying the trend from 1987/88-1993-94.
Table 1. India: Aggregated and Sectoral Growth Accounting
(annual average growth rates, unless otherwise specified)
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Period 60s and 70s 70s and 80s 80s and 90s 60s, 70s, 80s, and 90s
Initial Income 0.006 0.008 0.011
1.15 1.34 2.04
1960s Convergence dummy 0.008
1.75
1970s Convergence dummy 0.007
1.65
1980s Convergence dummy 0.011
2.71
1990s Convergence dummy 0.011
2.88
R-square 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.38
No. of observationss 38 41 42 80
Table 2. India: Unconditional State-Level Convergence
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60-70 70-80 80-90 90-00 60-80 80-00 60-00
Industrial Countries
Mean 4.12          2.12          1.54          1.47          3.12          1.51          2.34              
Standard Deviation 2.26          2.61          1.98          2.06          2.71          2.08          2.63              
Coefficient of Variation 0.55          1.23          1.29          1.41          0.87          1.38          1.13              
East Asia (incl. China)
Mean 4.19          4.11          4.15          3.98          4.15          4.07          4.11              
Standard Deviation 3.99          2.80          3.24          3.91          3.69          3.74          3.98              
Coefficient of Variation 0.95          0.68          0.78          0.98          0.89          0.92          0.97              
China
Mean 1.66          2.82          6.86          8.85          2.24          7.85          5.05              
Standard Deviation 12.45        3.40          3.59          2.37          8.90          3.13          7.17              
Coefficient of Variation 7.50          1.20          0.52          0.27          3.97          0.40          1.42              
Latin America
Mean 2.38          1.69          (1.65)         0.83          2.03          (0.48)         0.81              
Standard Deviation 3.47          4.00          4.40          3.03          4.07          4.17          4.43              
Coefficient of Variation 1.46          2.36          (2.66)         3.66          2.00          (8.70)         5.47              
India
Mean 1.91          0.77          3.91          3.22          1.34          3.57          2.45              
Standard Deviation 3.24          4.16          1.87          2.05          3.68          1.94          3.11              
Coefficient of Variation 1.69 5.40 0.48 0.64 2.74 0.54 1.27
Africa
Mean 1.87          0.69          (0.47)         (0.03)         1.28          (0.26)         0.53              
Standard Deviation 5.41          5.25          4.48          4.48          5.54          4.89          5.55              
Coefficient of Variation 2.90          7.56          (9.53)         (170.29)     4.33          (18.85)       10.47            
Middle East 2/
Mean 4.61          3.47          1.81          1.19          4.04          1.51          2.81              
Standard Deviation 5.83          6.64          3.42          2.77          6.55          3.21          5.44              
Coefficient of Variation 1.26          1.91          1.89          2.33          1.62          2.12          1.94              
Source: Bosworth and Collins (2003) and authors' calculations.
1/  All regional aggregates are unweighted averages.
2/  Excludes Jordan.
 Table 3. India in the Cross-Section: Mean and Volatility of Growth Rate of Output per Worker, 1960-2000 1/
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Dependent variable Total factor productivity
Period 1960-80 1980-99 1960-80 1980-99
Initial income -7.24 -5.92 -3.28 -3.60
-7.25 -5.28 -4.76 -4.59
Life expectancy 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.03
2.84 1.27 2.56 1.22
Terms of trade 0.13 -0.01 0.11 -0.13
2.13 -0.12 2.13 -1.67
Instability in terms of trade -0.12 0.00 -0.08 -0.01
-3.23 0.04 -2.38 -0.48
Budget balance 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01
0.79 0.56 0.36 0.38
Inflation -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
-0.44 -2.53 0.60 -2.29
Openness 0.53 2.03 0.12 0.82
1.83 2.72 0.33 1.59
Geography 0.34 0.33 0.03 0.20
2.08 1.11 0.15 0.98
Institutions 2.94 5.19 0.93 4.41
2.07 2.94 0.70 3.33
India dummy -1.72 2.99 -0.71 2.11
-5.35 4.74 -2.08 4.63
R-square 0.65 0.61 0.36 0.57
No. of observations 73 73 73 73
For description of variables, see Bosworth and Collins (2003).
Labor productivity
Table 4. India's Growth in Comparative Perspective
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Output Output  per Physical Factor Factor Physical
Region/Period Worker Capital Education Productivity Productivity Capital
Industrial Countries
 1960-80 4.42 3.05 1.22 1.61 1.30 43% 40%
 1980-99 2.68 1.60 0.78 0.98 0.64 40% 49%
1960-99 3.57 2.34 1.01 1.30 0.98 42% 43%
East Asia (incl. China)
 1960-80 5.64 2.98 1.45 1.93 0.96 32% 49%
 1980-99 8.03 6.02 2.44 2.85 3.25 54% 41%
1960-99 6.80 4.45 1.93 2.38 2.07 46% 43%
China
 1960-80 4.04 1.83 0.76 0.43 0.64 35% 41%
 1980-99 9.75 7.85 2.63 0.36 4.71 60% 33%
1960-99 6.78 4.72 1.66 0.39 2.60 55% 35%
Latin America
 1960-80 6.10 2.90 1.08 1.42 1.45 50% 37%
 1980-99 2.20 -0.54 0.09 0.48 -1.02 189% -17%
1960-99 4.18 1.21 0.60 0.96 0.24 20% 49%
India
 1960-80 3.41 1.28 0.72 0.43 0.12 9% 56%
 1980-99 5.73 3.60 1.18 0.33 2.05 57% 33%
1960-99 4.53 2.40 0.95 0.38 1.06 44% 39%
Africa
 1960-80 4.36 1.78 1.06 1.21 0.66 37% 59%
 1980-99 2.02 -0.70 -0.12 0.25 -0.93 134% 18%
1960-99 3.21 0.57 0.48 0.74 -0.12 -21% 85%
Middle East
 1960-80 5.71 3.14 2.74 3.25 0.28 9% 87%
 1980-99 3.68 0.85 0.20 0.81 -0.08 -9% 23%
1960-99 4.71 2.02 1.50 2.06 0.11 5% 74%
Source: Bosworth and Collins (2003)
Table 5. Contributions to Growth: India in the Cross-Section, 1960-1999
in percentage points in % of total
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1980-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00
All Industries
Average effective rate of protection 115.1 125.9 80.2 40.4
Import coverage ratio  97.6 91.6 38.0 24.8
Import penetration rate  10.0 11.0 12.0 16.0
Intermediate Goods
Average effective rate of protection 147.0 149.2 87.6 40.1
Import coverage ratio  98.3 98.3 41.8 27.6
Import penetration rate  11.0 13.0 15.0 18.0
Capital Goods
Average effective rate of protection 62.8 78.5 54.2 33.3
Import coverage ratio  95.1 77.2 20.5 8.2
Import penetration rate  12.0 12.0 12.0 19.0
Consumer goods
Average effective rate of protection 101.5 111.6 80.6 48.3
Import coverage ratio  98.7 87.9 45.7 33.4
Import penetration rate  4.0 4.0 4.0 10.0
Source: Das (2003)
Table 6. India. Measures of Trade Protection, 1980-2000
(in percent)
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
India -0.39 -0.49 -0.82 -0.68 0.04
0.13 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.10
China 0.52 0.39 0.39 -0.30 0.71
0.15 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.12
Standard errors below coefficients.  Coefficient estimates for the
standard covariates not reported.
Source: Based on data in Subramanian and Wei (2003).
Table 7.  Gravity Model Results of Trade Outcome for India and China













1961-70 0.7% 3.2% -1.5%
1971-80 -0.5% 3.9% 5.1% -0.5% -5.7%
1981-90 2.5% -1.0% 0.9% 1.3% 8.6%
1991-2000 1.6% -3.7% -2.2%
Table 8A. India: Growth of Public Investment Ratio






TFP growth Infr. 1/ Total Pub. 2/ Infr. 1/ Total Pub. 2/ Infr. 1/ Total Pub. 2/ Infr. 1/ Total Pub. 2/
Bosworth-
Collins
1961-70 0.7% 1.1% -0.5% 0.6% -0.3%
1971-80 -0.5% 1.3% 1.7% 0.7% 0.9% -0.2% -1.9% -0.1% -1.0%
1981-90 2.5% -0.3% 0.3% -0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 2.9% 0.2% 1.5%
1991-2000 1.6% -1.2% -0.7% -0.7% -0.4%
Sources: Authors' calculations. Infrastructure spending data are from  (Joshi and Little, 1994, Table 13.7)
Data on total public investment are from Joshi and Little (1994) for 1961-70 and WEO for 1971-2000
1/ Government spending on infrastructure
2/ Total public spending
Table 8B. Estimates of Contribution of Public Capital to TFP Growth, 1960-2000
Contribution of Public Capital to TFP Growth
Contemporaneous Lagged 5-years
alpha=.25 alpha=.15 alpha=.25 alpha=.15
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Dependent variable Growth rate of Difference in growth
reg. manuf. between reg. and
unreg. manuf.
Initial income 0.011 0.009
2.53 1.92
State party allied with Centre 60 0.000 0.029 0.027
0.01 1.51 1.40
State party allied with Centre 70 -0.006 0.015 -0.002
-0.85 0.57 -0.08
State party allied with Centre 80 0.021 0.097 0.058
2.68 3.07 2.09
State party allied with Centre 90 0.027 0.004 -0.035
2.48 0.10 -1.17
Initial level of registered manufacturing -0.005 -0.008
-1.28 -1.98
Party*share of registered manufacturing 60 -0.077
-0.94
Party*share of registered manufacturing 70 -0.151
-1.73
Party*share of registered manufacturing 80 0.266
2.48
Party*share of registered manufacturing 90 0.241
3.04
R square 0.41 0.40 0.23 0.29
No. of observations 58 58 59 59
Sources: Unless otherwise specified, data are from the Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation.
Data on political parties compiled from xxxx. T-statistics reported below coefficient estimate.
1/  Suffixes indicate that the underlying variable has been interacted with the appropriate decadal dummy.
Table 9: India: Attitudinal Shift 1/
Growth rate of per
capita domestic
product
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Period 1980 1999 1980 1999 1980 1999 1980 1999
Geography 0.04 -0.07 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03
5.19 -1.51 2.74 -0.93 1.72 0.21 1.23 4.55
Openness 0.27 -0.89 0.43 -0.54 -0.10 -0.54 -0.04 0.01
1.07 -1.18 0.66 -2.03 -0.28 -0.71 -0.17 0.03
Economic institutions  0.51 2.60 1.53 1.47
4.32 3.05 1.36 6.80
Political institutions  0.38 0.65 0.46 0.45
3.24 2.90 5.39 5.92
India dummy -1.36 -1.40 -1.06 -1.33 -2.61 -2.34 -2.61 -1.69
-4.61 -2.36 -1.28 -4.92 -4.59 -3.27 -6.82 -5.95
Instrument for institutions EURFRAC, ENGFRAC EURFRAC, ENGFRAC
No. of observations 48 66 76 114 58 58 91 91
For description of geography and openness variables and the instruments for institutions, see Rodrik et. al. (2002)
For 1980, economic institutions measured as the protection against expropriation in 1982  from ICRGE. 
For 1999, economic institutions measured as in Rodrik et. al. (2002).
Political institutions are measures as the constraint on the executive.
T-statistics reported below coefficient estimates
Settler mortality Settler mortality
Table 10. How Far Below is India from Its Steady State Level of Income? 41 
 
 
Initial income 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.019 0.007
2.64 1.84 2.27 1.54 3.86 1.27
70s dummy -0.003 -0.002
-0.78 -0.30
80s dummy 0.014 0.007
3.85 1.14
90s dummy 0.013 0.005
2.61 0.51
Initial income 70 -0.001
-0.37




Share of registered manufacturing 60 -0.046 -0.079 -0.050 -0.030
-0.73 -1.70 -0.73 -0.45
Share of registered manufacturing 70 -0.050 -0.104 -0.044 -0.046
-0.94 -2.43 -0.81 -1.01
Share of registered manufacturing 80 0.076 0.119 0.080 0.170
1.79 3.37 1.78 3.76
Share of registered manufacturing 90 0.100 0.113 0.096 0.157
1.44 2.64 1.31 2.81
Labor regulation 60 0.004 -0.001
0.73 -0.23
Labor regulation 70 0.012 0.008
2.14 1.45
Labor regulation 80 -0.008 -0.008
-2.21 -3.56
Labor regulation 90 0.000 0.000
0.05 0.11
R square 0.38 0.42 0.40 0.42 0.34 0.55
No. of observations 80 78 78 78 59 59
Sources: Unless otherwise specified, data are from the Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation.
Data on labor regulation from Besley and Burgess (2002). T-statistics reported below coefficient estimate.
1/  Suffixes indicate that the underlying variable has been interacted with the appropriate decadal dummy.
Table 11: Role of Manufacturing in Productivity Surge 1/




Initial income 0.012 0.009 0.011 0.010 -0.003 -0.003 0.018
2.39 2.22 2.43 2.13 -0.21 -0.19 1.50
70s dummy 0.005 0.003
0.59 0.39
80s dummy 0.020 0.016
2.06 2.22
90s dummy 0.044 0.014
3.26 1.03
Initial income 70 -0.003
-0.78




Share of registered manufacturing 60 -0.096 -0.122 -0.010
-0.75 -0.70 -0.06
Share of registered manufacturing 70 -0.157 -0.032 -0.124
-1.31 -0.20 -0.99
Share of registered manufacturing 80 0.301 0.194 0.294
3.40 2.18 3.01
Share of registered manufacturing 90 0.150 0.180 0.128
1.28 1.01 0.80
Share of agriculture 60 -0.008 0.020
-0.62 1.14
Share of agriculture 70 -0.016 0.006
-1.12 0.54
Share of agriculture 80 0.019 0.010
1.27 0.58
Share of agriculture 90 0.013 -0.061
0.81 -2.06
Share of infrastructure 60 2/ -0.332 0.083
-1.44 0.27
Share of infrastructure 70 2/ -0.518 -0.244
-2.26 -0.97
Share of infrastructure 80 2/ 0.288 0.110
1.75 0.73
Share of infrastructure 90 2/ 0.193 0.106
1.23 0.35
Labor regulation 60 -0.006
-0.29
Labor regulation 70 0.020
1.70
Labor regulation 80 -0.015
-2.65
Labor regulation 90 -0.001
-0.07
R square 0.33 0.43 0.45 0.48 0.19 0.21 0.37
No. of observations 80 80 63 63 77 77 59
Sources: Except as otherwise specified, all data are from the Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation.
Data on labor regulation from Besley and Burgess (2002). T-statistics reported below coefficient estimate.
1/  Suffixes indicate that the underlying variable has been interacted with the appropriate decadal dummy.
2/  Infrastructure includes railways, electricity, gas and water supply, and communication.
Table 12: Role of Manufacturing in Productivity Surge: Robustness Checks 1/
per capita growth  per capita non-agri. Growth
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